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In the former paper an attempt was made to state the
problems which grow out of irregularities in the organization
of corporations and joint-stock companies. The various
solutions worked out by the courts were set forth and some
emphasis was laid upon the tendency (in the case of alleged
corporations as distinguished from joint-stock companies) to
confine a plaintiff in his recovery to the corporate fund instead
of permitting him to recover against the associates as partners.
Another phase of the same tendency was thought to be dis-
cernible in that class of cases in which, where the corporation
is suing as a plaintiff, the courts preclude the defendant from
taking refuge behind an irregularity in the plaintiff's corporate
organization. It was sugge. -d that if these results could be
asserted without qualification, 'he law would have gained
much-at least as far as simplicit, of statement is concerned.
It was observed, however, that suits by or against associates
claiming to be incorporated are still likely to be complicated
by a consideration of the degrees of compliance or non-compli-
ance with statutory prescriptions and by a discussion of the
amount of user necessary for the conception of a de facto
corporation. The justification for the retention of these com-
i6i
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plicating elements was found in the prevalent belief that the
courts must in this way discourage the usurpation of corporate
franchises by unauthorized individuals and discountenance the
attempt to obtain the benefits of limited liability without a
corresponding willingness to bear its burdens. While recog-
nizing the paramount importance of regularity in corporate
organization and the great dangers attendant upon the usurpa-
tion of corporate power, it was suggested that the true way in
which to reach the desired result is to develop the machinery
for checking and punishing irregularity and usurpation in
proceedings instituted by the state for that purpose, as distin-
guished from the introduction into private litigation of a
consideration of the relations between the corporation and the
state. In the pages that follow it is proposed briefly to
develop the thought which lies at the basis of this suggestion.
The suggested theory is this: Where associates hold them-
selves out as a corporation and engage in business as such,
they shall be treated as a corporation in all private litigation
between themselves and those who make contracts with them
in the course of the business in which they are engaged. If
the associates sue as a corporation upon such a contract, the
defendant cannot set up the irregularity of the plaintiff's
corporate organization as a defence. If they are sued as
partners, they may defend on the ground that the plaintiff
contracted with them when they were doing business
as a corporation. If the contract is made pending an unexe-
cuted intention to organize as a corporation, the associates are
of course liable as individuals. If, however, the contract is
made after the associates have assumed to organize as a
corporation, there is no individual liability at law, even if the
plaintiff did not in fact know of the organization. Not only,
however, is a doing of business without compliance with the
statute to be made punishable at the instance of the state, but
wherever the assertion of a corporate organization amounts to
a fraud upon creditors, relief may be had in equity by the
aggrieved creditor against all those who used the corporate
organization as a means of fraud.
The basis of the suggested theory is not in any sense
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estoppel. The right of an irregular corporation to recover in
contract cannot be worked out upon the theory that the
defendant is estopped from denying the corporate existence any
more than it can be said with accuracy that a creditor-plaintiff
is estopped from treating the members of an irregular corpora-
tion as partners. It is difficult to find the elements of estoppel
in these cases. The basis of the theory is contract. The
individual and the associates acting as a corporation have given
to the entity a legal existence at least for the purposes of the
contract which they have made; and it may be said of the
individual that he either has a corporate contract or he has no
contract at all. If the organization is inchoate: that is to say,
if the associates themselves recognize that some steps are yet
to be taken before they can attain corporate existence, it should
seem to be a logical conclusion that no corporate contract can
exist. Neither party, bysupposition, intends to make a corporate
contract. If, however, the contract is made after the associates
have begun to do business as a corporation, then a contract
entered into in the course of business must be treated as a
corporate contract, for there is no intention upon their part to
bind themselves individually. It is of the essence of the sug-
gested theory, however, that the adoption of a corporate form
of organization should be susceptible of treatment by a court
of equity as being itself a fraud upon creditors, in cases in
which the usual ind-ia of fraud are present and the creditors
have in fact suffered damage. If a corporation is organized
without paying into its treasury in cash the percentage of
capital required by the act, the fact of non-compliance with the
statutory provision will be of itself a ground for the with-
drawal by the state of the corporate privilege which the
associates have abused. As between the corporation and an
individual, however, the non-payment of the required percent-
age will in no sense give to the individual a right to treat the
contract which he has made as being other than a corporate
contract. If he can show that the associates have acted in bad
faith and that he has actually been prejudiced by their conduct,
he can have recourse to an unlimited liability in equity by
treating the corporate organization as a mere device put
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forward to hinder and delay creditors. In other words, he
will be in all cases confined to his contract rights unless the
facts are such that he can show himself entitled to file a bill to
obtain some recognized form of equitable relief. There will
no longer be room for a discussion in private litigation of the
extent of compliance or non-compliance with statutory require-
ments. There will no longer be a place for a consideration in
private litigation of what does and what does not amount to
user of corporate privileges. The only question for considera-
tion will be the question whether the associates have or have
not in good faith assumed to act as a corporation. If they
have, no liability can be enforced except liability upon the
corporate contract. If, on the other hand, what they have
done has not not been done in good faith, an injured plaintiff
has all the rights which belong in equity to victims of a fraud
upon creditors.
If instead of a case of irregular organization it appears that
the asssociates have regularly organized but have in reality
used the corporation law as a device to enable a sole trader to
obtain limited liability, it is suffciently obvious that the sug-
gested theory places no obstacle in the way of a solution of
the problem. The theory deals with the relations between an
individual and a corporation where the corporation is so
irregularly organized that the state may proceed against the
associates if it sees fit to do so. In the case now put, however,
the state has by supposition no rights against the associates
because the associates have complied with the requirements of
the law. If the associates have satisfied the conditions imposed "
by the state, afortiori they are exempt from attack at the suit
of private individuals. This seems to be the true explanation
of the case of Broderip v. Salomon (Salomon v. Salomon & Co.
Limited and Cross Appeal)' recently decided by the House of
Lords. Readers of the former paper will recollect that the
decision of the Court of Appeal in this case was commended
by the New York Times, while the decision of the House of
175 Law Times, 426, (1897). The decision in the Court of Appeal
(which was reversed by the House of Lords) is reported in 72 L. T. Rep.
755, and in 2 Ch. Div. (1895) 323. The Court of Appeal had affirmed an
order of Williams, J. reported in 72 L. T. Rep. 261.
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Lords was criticised as conferring upon traders an "unlimited
authority to cheat." I It is subreitted, however, that there is
no escape from the conclusion that the decision of the House
of Lords was correct. The facts of the case are thus stated
by Lord Herschell at page 432: "By an order of the High
Court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, it was
declared that the respondent company, or the liquidator of
that company, was entitled to be indemnified by the appellant
against the sum of 67733 8s. 3d. and it was ordered that
the respondent company should recover that sum against the
appellant. On the 28th July 1892 the respondent company
was incorporated with a capital of £,4o,ooo, divided into
4o,ooo shares of L'I each. One of the objects for which the
company was incorporated was to carry out an agreement,
with such modifications therein as might be agreed to, of the
2oth July, 1892, which had been entered into between the
appellant and a trustee for a company intended to be formed
for the acquisition by the company of the business then carried
on by the appellant. The company was in fact formed for the
purpose of taking over the appellant's business of leather
merchant and boot manufacturer, which he had carried on for
many years. The business had been a prosperous one, and,
ag the learned judge who tried the action found, was solvent
at the time when the company was incorporated. The memo-
randum of association of the company was subscribed by the
appellant his wife and daughter, and his four sons, each
subscribing for one share. The appellant afterwards had
2o,ooo shares allotted to him. For these he paid 6I per share
out of the purchase money which, by agreement, he was to
receive for the transfer of his business to the company. The
company afterwards became insolvent and went into liquidation.
In an action brought by a debenture-holder on behalf of him-
self and all the other debenture-holders, including the appellant,
the respondent company set up by way of counter-claim that
the company was formed by Aaron Salomon, and the deben-
tures were issued in order that he might carry on the said
business and take all the profits without risk to himself, that
136 American Law Register and Review (N. S.) p. 19.
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the company was the mere nominee and agent of Aaron
Salomon, and that the company or the liquidator thereof was
entitled to be indemnified by Aaron Salomon against all the
debts owing by the company to creditors other than Aaron
Salomon. This counter-claim was not in the pleading as
originally delivered: it was inserted by way of amendment at
the suggestion of Williams, J., before whom the action came
on for trial. The learned judge thought the liquidator entitled
to the relief asked for and made the order complained of. He
was of opinion that the company was only an alias for
Salomon: that the intention being that he should take the
profits without running the risk of the debts, the company was
merely an agent for him, having incurred liabilities at his
instance, was, like any other agent under such circumstances,
entitled to be indemnified by him against them. On appeal
the judgment of Williams, J., was affirmed by the Court of
Appeal, that court 'being of opinion that the formation of the
company, the agreement of Aug. 1892, and the issue of
debentures to Aaron Salomon pursuant to such agreement
were a mere scheme to enable him to carry on business in the
name of the company with limited liability contrary to the true
intent and meaning of the Companies Act 1862, and further,
to enable him to obtain a preference over other creditors of the
company by procuring a first charge on the assets of the
company by means of such debentures.' The learned judges
in the Court of Appeal dissented from the view taken by
Williams, J., that the company was to be regarded as the agent
of the appellant. They considered the relation between them
to be that of trustee and cestui que trust, but this difference of
view, of course, did not affect the conclusion that the right to
the indemnity claimed had been established. It is to be
observed that both courts treated the company as a legal entity
distinct from Salomon and the then members who composed
it, and therefore as a.validly constituted corporation. This is,
indeed, necessarily involved in the judgment which declared
that the company was entitled to certain rights as against
Salomon." ( Now either the organization formed by Salomon
and the m(mbers of his family was or was not a corpora-
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tion as between themselves and the sovereign. )If the court
had decided that it was not a corporation, then the questions
heretofore discussed would have demanded consideration-
how far, namely, creditors could take advantage of this
-circumstance in private litigation. But the judges of the Court
of Appeal admitted that all things had been done in the matter
of organization which the statute required and it seems fair to
say that they conceded that a valid corporation had come into
being even as against the sovereign. If, then, the organization
was. a corporation as between itself and the sovereign, certain
important consequences followed. In the first place, the title
to its property was vested in it and, in point of law, its business
was to be regarded as carried on by it. In the second place,
its debentures were perfect obligations and enforcible against
it unless they could be impeached for fraud. Thirdly, the
relation between the corporation and its stockholders was not
that of trust-for as the corporation had the legal title, the
stockholders could not be treated as trustees; and that the
interest of a stockholder in a corporation is not an equitable in-
terest is the well settled modern doctrine. It follows that to
say that under such circumstances the business and property
were "substantially Salomon's" means nothing. _Either the
business and property were Salomon's or they were not. ) If it
be assumed that they were, the assumption is inconsistent with
the finding of the Court of Appeal that a corporation came
regularly into being. If they were not, then they were the
property of the corporation, and must be dealt with as having
the ordinary incidents of other corporate property. Of fraud
there was no evidence. The only suggestion was that the
property had been sold by Salomon to the company at an
over-valuation and that the sale should therefore be rescinded.
In support of this suggestion reference was made to Erlanger
v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co.' In the Salomon case, how-
ever as the House of Lords pointed out, the only persons who
could have a standing to allege fraud were the stockholders
other than Salomon, and it appeared affirmatively that they
knew all the facts and had not been deceived. As the
1.39 L. T. Rep. 269: 3 App. Cas. 128.
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corporation could not under this view of the case be treated
as the agent or trustee for Salomon, it acquired no right as
against him to be indemnified and the reversal of the decision
of the Court of Appeal seemed to follow by an inevitable
necessity.
It is submitted, therefore, that the suggested theory leads
to sound conclusions as between the corporation and the indi-
viduals with whom it contracts and that it is in no sense
inconsistent with the result worked out by the House of
Lords in Broderip v. Salomon.
It may be urged, however, that the theory practically
involves the conception of a corporation created without the
intervention of the sovereign power, inasmuch as under this
theory a creditor would be confined to the corporate fund
even in a case where the associates had failed to file a certifi-
cate or charter under their act or had omitted to comply with
some one or all of the most important statutory prescriptions.
The answer is that as between the associates and the state
there can be no valid exercise of corporte privileges without
the consent of the sovereign power. It does not follow from
this admission, however, that there may not be such a thing
as a quasi-corporation resulting from contract as between a
group of associates and those with whom they have business.
"Some, again," say Pollock and Maitland,' " may feel inclined
to say that a corporation must have its origin in a special act
of the State, for example, in England, a royal charter; but
they again will be in danger of begging a question about
ancient history, while they will have the utmost difficulty in
squaring their opinion with the modem history of joint-stock
companies. Modem legislation enables a small group of pri-
vate men to engender a corporation by registration, and to
urge that this is the effect of ' statute' and not of 'common
law' is to insist upon a distinction which we hardly dare
carry beyond the four seas."
An economic objection may be made to the theory on the
ground that one consequence of it will be the removal of the
present sanction of regular organization and the substitution
'History of English Law, Vol. I., p. 470.
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i-of-stfit" infitif6F 'in 11 gpifient -in which it is most unwise
That th, 'state°shaiild'have c6nit 'l" It may be contended that
since 'eC iratidnis~tepres' iif'asi adzumulations of wealth and
ihfluenieL, 'tlieexeuiitve nfid'jdicial officers of the state will
be'.subjecded to great temptations to stay their hands and to
ntaok -r 'steps ,"n '-tl' dir c'ti6fi';bPrestraining the exercise of
'corp6ratfeptivil6ges by" uiauthdiizd persons. In support of
-th~isdatuient, Ytention 'is -called 'to the alleged inefficiency of
the tonmon law' renedy by quo warranto as practically admin-
iste-ed in Oui- Cbmm6nwealths. These are important consid-
erdtb3ns, but it' "i§ submitted -that: they are by no means as
veighty as'at first tppe~ts. As' an answer to the objection it
ftiay bSe sdid that ,frtriithe 'econ6nic point of view, the wis-
dom ot unwisdom of the'-suggested development is scarcely
open for considerAtioh,-bcause ai examination of the reports
shows 'that-the' '"tram of tendency has actually carried the
idourts' tao'the point bt, whichthi theory here insisted upon is
necessary togive a legal explanation of their position. The
theory' is not made "'out' of the whole cloth," but represents
an- attempt':to explain the .observed phenomena of judicial
decision and to facilitate the ektifiction of a few anachronisms
which mar the uniformity of the law. In the second place,
attention is called to the fact, that' the questions of irregular
incorporaidon with which the' courts have had to deal do not
aPpea r to- ,havel-arisen in'th& case of corporations of great
wealth ind 'infieuhice. In 'other words, it has been true in the
past-'andit will continue to be true in the future, that strict
compliahce, with stAtutotiy provisions is the best policy to be
piutsued' by: those'who propose to stake large interests in the
corporate 'ehterprige. The qfiegtions, as a rule, have arisen in
connection with trading corporations doing business in a way
that is -nall -when 'cOmpared with the class of great corpora-
tions-of which one' thinks vhe'n a reference is made to cor-
prorate wealth 'and 'influence: -*Paitnership liability has been
s6ught to be 'nfcrced by -the- 'creditors of these smaller con-
cetns, as a sort 'or" forlorn -hope "--an attempt to obtain
recourse 'td a source f, payment to'which the creditor did not
l6ok when the debt -was originally contracted. In many cases,
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the questions have arisen as the result of the promotion of
wild-cat enterprises and schemes of adventurers who have
sought to obtain a share of the profits of some legitimate cor-
porate business established by the enterprise and integrity of
large and solvent organizations. In such cases frauds are per-
petrated upon creditors, and accordingly the theory recognizes
that the elastic decree of a court of chanceryis best adapted
to meet the exigencies of the situation. The point insisted
upon, however, is that the class of corporations which are, in
fact, irregularly organized iare not in a position to exercise
corrupt influence upon administrative officials. In so far as
great and powerful corporations are interested in the matter of
regular organization at all, their interest is identical with that
of the state, for experience shows (in the domain of insurance,
for example) that the substantial and solvent insurance com-
panies are the most active in setting in motion the legal
machinery for punishing their trnscrupulous and fraudulent
competitors. Finally, it may be suggested that from the
administrative point of view, a system which divides the
responsibility of corporate supervision between the judiciary
and the executive department is fundamentally unsound. It
is believed that if reform is needed in the direction of greater
activity upon the part of the state in keeping corporate enter-
prise within bounds, the way to secure the reform is to
emphasize the responsibility of the state and not to shrink
from a recognition of it. It must not be forgotten, moreover,
that an acceptance of the suggested theory leads naturally to
the adoption of stringent legislative enactments imposing fine
or imprisonment or both upon those who usurp corporate
privileges without complying with the conditions imposed by
the state.
Again, it may be objected that, however desirable the
results of the suggested theory may be, the acceptance of it
is inexpedient as being in effect "judicial legislation " and,
therefore, to be condemned as dangerous. It may be said in
reply that the modern decisions in regard to defacto corpora-
tions which have proceeded upon no coherent legal theory are
indeed open to criticism as being instances of judicial legisla-
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tion, but that no such objection can properly be directed
against a theory which is, after all, nothing more than a gen-
eralization from observed facts in social and economic develop-
ment. The growth of corporate activity amongst us has been
a rapid growth, and it has necessitated a rapid development of
our legal ideas. It used to take centuries for legal doctrines
to attain maturity, but in these days each decade makes a
definite contribution to our jurisprudence. When the judges
move faster than society, they are justly criticised for legisla-
ting from the bench. It is an open question whether or not
they are acting judicially when they merely keep abreast of the
march of social progress. The suggested theory, it will be
observed, does not require them to do more than keep a
respectful distance behind the front of the column.
A study of the English Reports seems to indicate that in
England the problems of irregular organization have hereto-
fore been. dealt with in a different way. There has been no
gradual growth of decisions of the class summarized in the
former paper and drawn upon as the source of the suggested
theory. The English solution of the problem of irregular
incorporation must, therefore, be a legislative solution. In-
deed, this fact has been recognized by our Ei.glish brethren,
and a Committee recently appointed by the Board of Trade
to inquire into the matter of the formation and management
of companies have made a most elaborate and interesting
report in favor of an amendment of the Companies Act and
have annexed to their report a draft of a bill to accomplish
the needed reform. This report and the draft of the bill have
come into the hands of the present writer since the publication
in this magazine of the first paper on irregu!ar incorporation,
and after the present paper was mapped out. It is interesting
to note that the draft of the bill reported by the Committee
(so far as it deals with the question of irregular incorporation),.
in effect puts the suggested theory into actual operation.
Section I provides that a certificate of incorporation given by
the registrar in respect of any association, shall be conclusive
evidence that all the requisitions of the Companies Acts, in
respect of registration and all matters precedent and incidental
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thereto, have been complied with, and that the association is a
company authorized to be registered and duly registered
under the Companies Acts. Section 36 provides that the
company may be wound up (inter alia): "Where the court is
satisfied that a certificate of incorporation has been obtained
by fraud, misrepresentation or mistake or by a wilful violation
of any provision of the Companies Acts; or where the court
is satisfied that the Company was formed or that its business
has been carried on with the intent or in such manner as to
defraud, defeat or delay the creditors of the company, or of
any other company, or for any fraudulent or illegal purpose."
The learned Committee (which included Lord Davey, Sir
Joseph William Chitty, Sir Roland Vaughan Williams, and a
number of other distinguished men), formulated their report at
a time when the appeal in Broderip v. Salomon was still pending
in the House of Lords. The Committee annexed the opinions
of the judges in the Court of Appeal to their report and after
summarizing the decision of that tribunal, used the following
language: " If this view be correct, it appears to your Com-
mittee unnecessary to suggest any amendment to the existing
law; but they think that some addition to the grounds upon
which a winding-up order may be made, would be desirable in
order to meet such cases as that of Aron Salomon, and pos-
sibly also cases of the kind to which the Pharmaceutical
Society and the Medical Associations have called attention.'
They have accordingly suggested a clause making it a cause
of winding-up (a) where a certificate of incorporation has been
obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, or by a wilful
violation of any provision of the Companies Acts, or (b) where
the Court is satisfied that the company was formed or that its
business has been carried on with the intent or in such manner
as to defraud, defeat, or delay the creditors of the company
or of any other company or person, or for any fraudulent
or illegal purpose; and in such cases giving the court power
1 These were cases in which persons sought to evade the provisions of
the Pharmaceutical and Medical Acts by becoming incorporated and thus
putting themselves beyond the terms of those statutes. The Committee
were of opinion that this evil could best be dealt with by amending the
Pharmaceutical and Medical Acts.
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to declare the liability of any one or more of the mem-
bers for all or some of the debts to be unlimited. They
also propose that in such cases the Attorney-General may
petition. But your Committee cannot recommend any gen-
eral enactment rendering the members liable without limit
where there are seven members, but some of those members
do not hold what may be called a substantial interest, or are
trustees only for other persons..... .. It is not usually the
creditors of the original owner of the business_ who suffer, but
the creditors of the company. Now, so long as the company
is a going concern, and pays its way, no harm is done to any-
body. But when the company fails to pay its creditors it
may be wound up, and in that event the power proposed to
be given to the court in aid of the existing law would come
in and enable the court if one or a few individuals have been
carrying on business under the cloak of a company in abuse
of the Acts to make them liable. It is further suggested that
persons conspiring to defraud by means of such devices as
described in Aaron Salomon's case are amenable to the crim-
inal law." What amendments will be suggested in view of
the decision of the House of Lords is, of course, only a
matter of conjecture. The point upon which it is desired to
insist is that our English brethren recognize (I) the importance
of treating the certificate as conclusive, (2) the wisdom of enlarg-
ing the remedy by compulsory winding up and by petition of
the Attorney-General and (3) the expediency of imposing crim-
inal penalty for abusing the privileges conferred by corpora-
tion laws. It may be remarked incidentally that the volume
containing the report will amply repay careful study, for it
evidences a most thorough and satisfactory investigation of
the whole subject by the learned Committee, and a determina-
tion upon their part to familiarize themselves with the prac-
tical operation of corporation laws and companies' acts in
Germany, France and in the United States. The report is in
itself a lesson upon the right way in which to prepare an act
of legislature.
It is submitted, in conclusion, 'that there is reason for
believing that both the English experience and our own tend
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to establish the soundness of the result which can be reached
by applying the suggested theory. In England the state of
legal development is such that the result can be attained
only by an Act of Parliament. With us, such progress has
been made by the courts in the direction of a solution satis-
factory to the world of industry and commerce, that no obstacle
stands in the way of the acceptance by the judges of a theory
which provides the necessary safe-guards for the purchasers
of shares, which makes ample provision for the supervision
and control of corporate activity and to a great extent banishes
that anachronism the de facto corporation from the realm of
private litigation.
George Wharton Pepper.
Philadelphia, March z, z897.
